Research on Dual-Channel Supply Chain Equilibrium with the Considering of Distributional and Peer-Induced Fairness Preference of Retailer
Abstract
A Stackelberg game model is built to research on the impact of retailer’s distributional and peer-induced fairness preference on dual-channel supply chain equilibrium. It points out that (i) the retail price is increasing with the distributional fairness, and the wholesale price and direct sale price is decreasing with distributional fairness; (ii) the retail price is decreasing with the distributional fairness, and the wholesale price and direct sale price is increasing with distributional fairness. And the impact of peer-induced fairness preference on the supply chain can partially decrease the impact of distributional fairness on the supply chain, which has been verified by numerical analysis.
Keywords
Dual-channel, Distributional fairness preference, Peer-induced fairness preference, Supply chain equilibrium
DOI
10.12783/dtcse/CCNT2018/24754
10.12783/dtcse/CCNT2018/24754
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