The Evolutionary Game Analysis and Research of the Government and the Aged Care Institutions in the Marketization of the off-site Pension

Yi-han LUO, Deng-wen-di XU, Bo-wen ZHUO, Xue-jiao PENG

Abstract


The aging society in China is a serious phenomenon. How to establish an effective and professional pension system/industry is an important method to solve the burden of heavy pensions in the aging society. The rise of new models of old-age support in different places has aroused widespread concern. The purpose of this paper is to explore the solution to the phenomenon of inhibiting the development of off-site pension market after the game of interests between the government and the pension institutions under this model will cause serious loss of users, shortage of funds, and social dishonesty. Using evolutionary game mathematics model to explore the impact of government regulations on the marketization of pension institutions, and to introduce the influencing factors of strategic choices of government and pension institutions and the degree of influence on the marketization of off-site pension development. At last propose innovations in terms of systems, mechanisms, and models, which promote the healthy development of off-site pensions

Keywords


Evolutionary game, Government regulation, Off-site pension market, Institutional innovation, Mechanism innovation, Model innovation


DOI
10.12783/dtcse/CCNT2018/24774

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