Evolutionary Game of Counterfeit between Industrial E-commerce Third-Party Platform and Settled Merchants under New Media Environment

Abstract

Settled merchants counterfeiting on industrial e-commerce platform have become the focus of government and media. To analysis the evolutionary mechanism of counterfeiting between industrial e-commerce platform and settled merchants under New Media environment, an evolutionary game model was built. The influence and authenticity of New Media reports were taken into account in the counterfeit game between platform and settled merchants. The research shows that the influence and authenticity of New Media reports have a significant impact on the evolution of counterfeit on industrial e-commerce platform. The third-party platforms tend to supervise and the settled merchants tend to legitimate operation under efficient and accurate New Media environment. Meanwhile, third-party platforms tend to ignore supervision and settled merchants tend to counterfeit when New Media reports lack credibility. So, enhancing the supervision and improving the authenticity of New Media have a positive effect on counterfeiting in the third-party industrial e-commerce platform.