Equity Concentration, Executive Equity Incentive and Firm Performance —Based on Merger Enterprise Sample Data

Abstract

In the context of the separation of the two powers, there is principal-agent problems, managers and owners can not be completely consistent on the interests of the target, so improve the company's incentive mechanism and give executives a certain equity incentive, can produce a role in / of / as the final decision on corporate mergers and acquisitions behavior and the number of mergers and acquisitions, quality and long-term performance of mergers and acquisitions. Therefore, this paper chooses M & A enterprises as the basic sample, and studies the influence of executive equity incentive on the long-term business performance of the enterprise based on the different ownership concentration degree, and according to the stock ownership concentration criterion carries on the grouping return, that has a certain practical significance to perfect the enterprise equity incentive mechanism and improve the acquisition long-term performance of enterprises.