Evolutionary Game Path of Law-Based Government in China

Ying-Ying WANG, Chen-Wang XIE, Bo WEI

Abstract


Evolutionary game theory has good applicability in the study of law-based government in China. This paper mainly analyzes and studies the frame of the evolutionary game process from two dimensionality of complexity: horizontal process and vertical process. Two evolutionary game modes—horizontal spiral-promotion evolution mode and vertical interactive evolution game mode are discussed in order to prove "Endogenous evolution" rule of law can solve the "power paradox" of government. In the end the evolutionary game path of law-based government in China is put forward

Keywords


Evolutionary Game Path, Power Paradox, Law-Based Government in China

Publication Date


2016-12-08 00:00:00


DOI
10.12783/dtssehs/icaem2016/4343